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The complementation pattern of certain question-
embedding predicates, such as know and agree, presents
a puzzle for the compositional semantics of clausal
complementation, as the predicates seem to be able to
combine with two distinct types of semantic objects:
propositions and questions. The traditional approach to the
semantics of these predicates, where embedded questions
are reduced to propositions, faces two problems. First, it
cannot account for the observation that know-wh sentences
require the subject not to believe any false answer to
the embedded question. Second, it makes a problematic
prediction concerning the interpretation of Predicates of
Relevance, such as care and matter. We review three alter-
native approaches to the semantics of question-embedding
predicates, i.e., the proposition-to-question reduction,
the uniform approach and the ambiguity approach, and
argue that only the Proposition-to-Question reduction and
the uniform approach can deal with the interpretation of
the Predicates of Relevance. The paper concludes with a
remark on how lexical denotations of question-embedding
predicates are constrained in general.
1 INTRODUCTION: RESPONSIVE PREDICATES
This paper surveys approaches to the issue concerning the compositional semantics of pairs of
sentences like (1):
(1) a. Alice {knows/realized/reported} that Ann left. (declarative complement)
b. Alice {knows/realized/reported} who left. (interrogative complement)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2019 The Authors Language and Linguistics Compass Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Lang Linguist Compass. 2019;13:e12308. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/lnc 1 of 17
https://doi.org/10.1111/lnc3.12308
2 of 17 UEGAKI
These examples show that the same predicate (i.e., know, realize, and report) can embed either
a declarative complement or an interrogative complement. Following Lahiri (2002), I refer
to the predicates that show the complementation pattern exemplified in (1) as responsive
predicates. Responsive predicates pose a non-trivial puzzle for the compositional semantics of
complementation, in view of the following two fairly standard hypotheses:
(2) Semantic distinction of clause types Declarative complements and interrogative
complements denote semantic objects with distinct types.
Non-ambiguity Responsive predicates are unambiguous between its declarative-
embedding use and its interrogative-embedding use.
Of these two hypotheses, the non-ambiguity of responsive predicates is not only intuitively
plausible but also empirically motivated by an example involving gapping, as follows:
(3) Alice knows/realized/reported that Ann left and Bill —————————knows/realized/
—————reported which other girls left.
In this example, the first conjunct involves a declarative complement while the latter conjunct
involves an interrogative complement. The fact that the predicate can be gapped in the second
conjunct suggests that the predicates are non-ambiguous between the declarative-embedding
use and the interrogative-embedding use (see Sennet, 2016, for discussion of this and similar
diagnostics for ambiguity).
In addition, across multiple languages, clause-embedding predicates with similar lexical
semantics behave as responsive predicates, i.e., they can embed either declarative or interrogative
complements. For example, the Japanese counterparts of the predicates in (1) can embed both
types of complements, as demonstrated in (4) below:
(4) a. Alice-wa dono onnanoko-ga kita-ka sitteiru/kizuita/hookoku-sita.
Alice-top which girl-nom came-q know/realized/reported
“Alice knows/realized/reported which girl came.”
b. Alice-wa Mary-ga kita-to sitteiru/kizuita/hookoku-sita.
Alice-top Mary-nom came-decl know/realized/reported
“Alice knows/realized/reported that Mary came.”
The problem, then, is how to account for the complementation pattern of responsive predicates
given these empirical motivations for their non-ambiguity, while considering the plausibility of
the semantic distinction of declarative and interrogative clause types.
In this paper, I will survey four approaches to this problem in the literature. Two of the
approaches adhere to the basic hypotheses in (2) and reconcile their conflict by positing an opera-
tion that turns one kind of semantic object into the other. Depending on the direction of this extra
semantic operation, these two approaches will be called Question-to-Proposition reduc-
tion approach (or Q-to-P reduction) and Proposition-to-Question reduction approach
(or P-to-Q reduction). On the other hand, the other two approaches each reject one of the
hypotheses in (2). The one that rejects the non-ambiguity hypothesis is the ambiguity approach
while the one that rejects the semantic distinction of clause types will be referred to as the
uniform approach.
The structure of the paper will be the following. I will first present characteristics of the
most traditional approach to question-embedding, i.e. the Question-to-Proposition reduction
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approach, together with examples of compositional implementations in the literature (Section 2).
After this, I will present two arguments against theQ-to-P reduction (Section 3). These arguments
concern “non-reducibility” of certain presuppositional responsive predicates discussed by George
(2011) and interpretation of Predicates of Relevance, such as be relevant,matter, and care (Elliott,
Klinedinst, Sudo, & Uegaki, 2017). I will then introduce three alternative approaches, i.e., the
Proposition-to-Question reduction, the uniform approach, and the ambiguity approach, and com-
pare them in view ofwhether they can deal with the two problems for theQuestion-to-Proposition
reduction (Section 5). Finally, in Section 6, I discuss how the approaches can be compared in view
of restrictions they place on the space of possible responsive predicate denotations.
2 QUESTION-TO-PROPOSITION REDUCTION
The Q-to-P reduction approach is the most traditional approach to the semantics of responsive
predicates. This approach dates back at least to Hintikka (1962) and is also adopted by most of
subsequent analyses of question-embedding in the formal semantic literature, such as Karttunen
(1977), Heim (1994), Dayal (1996), Beck and Rullmann (1999), Lahiri (2002), and more recently
by Spector and Egré (2015) and Cremers (2016).1 The characteristics of the Q-to-P reduction
approach can be summarized as follows:
(5) The Question-to-Proposition reduction
• Responsive predicates semantically select for the denotation of the declarative com-
plement, i.e., propositions.
• The compositional semantics involves a mechanism that reduces the denotation of
an interrogative complement into a proposition.
Analyses within this approach differ in the exact formulation of the reduction mechanism. One
of the prominent formulations employs an answerhood operator, which maps the question
meaning denoted by an interrogative complement to a specific “answer” of the question (Beck &
Rullmann, 1999; Cremers, 2016; Dayal, 1996; Heim, 1994). I will give a concrete example of such
an operator shortly below, but doing this requires explicit assumptions about (a) the semantics
of interrogative complements and (b) what counts as an “answer” to a question expressed by an
interrogative complement.
As for (a), we follow Hamblin (1973) and assume that interrogative complements express sets
of propositions that are obtained by, roughly, varying the argument corresponding to thewh-item.
For example, the question expressed by who left is the set of propositions, as in the following:2
(6) [[who left]] ={p |∃x[p = 𝜆w′.leftw′ (x)]}
={“Ann left,” “Bill left,” “Carol left,” … }
As for (b), the issue of what counts as an answer to a question concerns the notion of
exhaustivity, that is, how much true information an answer must convey relative to the ques-
tionmeaning. In the literature, at least three levels of exhaustivity are discussed: mention-some,
weak exhaustivity, and strong exhaustivity. Answers having these different levels of
exhaustivity correspond to the following propositions in the case of (6), in the world where only
Ann and Bill left.:
(7) Situation: Only Ann and Bill left.
a. Mention-some answers: “Ann left,” “Bill left”
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b. Weakly-exhaustive answer: “Ann left and Bill left”
c. Strongly-exhaustive answer: “Ann left and Bill left, and no one else left.”
Comparing different theoretical accounts of exhaustivity in embedded questions requires a space
for another survey article. Thus, here, I will gloss over this issue and assume that the default read-
ing of embedded questions involves the weakly-exhaustive answer, following Karttunen (1977),
Heim (1994), Dayal (1996), Klinedinst and Rothschild (2011), and Uegaki (2015). In addition
to these works, see Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), Beck and Rullmann (1999), Guerzoni and
Sharvit (2007), George (2011), Spector and Egré (2015), Xiang (2016), and Theiler et al. (2018) for
overall treatments of exhaustivity in embedded questions.
With these assumptions in place, a concrete answerhood operator can be defined as
follows.3
(8) Answ ∶= 𝜆Q⟨st,t⟩∶ ∃p ∈ Q[p(w)].𝜆w′s.∀p′ ∈ Q[p′(w)→ p′(w′)]
This operator takes a question meaning as its input and outputs its weakly-exhaustive answer
(i.e., the conjunction of all true propositions in the question meaning), presupposing that at
least one proposition in the question meaning is true. Using this operator, we can analyze
interrogative-embedding sentences as follows:
(9) a. ⟦know⟧w = 𝜆p⟨s,t⟩𝜆xe∶ p(w).knoww(x, p)
b. ⟦Alice knows who left⟧w =⟦know⟧w(Answ(⟦who left⟧))(a)
=1iff∃x[leftw(x)] ∧ knoww(a,Answ(⟦who left]]))
Under this analysis, the denotation of a responsive predicate, for example, know, takes a proposi-
tion as its first argument. The questionmeaning is turned into a proposition by theAns-operator,
which is then fed to the proposition-taking denotation of the predicate.
Another implementation of reduction is seen in Spector and Egré (2015), who analyze
interrogative-embedding sentences in terms of existential quantification over answers to the
question.4 Letting pot(Q) be the set of potential weakly-exhaustive answers of Q and exhQ(p) be
the strongly-exhaustive answer of Q that corresponds to p (i.e., that has p as the “positive part”),
they roughly analyze a strongly-exhaustive reading as follows:5
(10) ⟦Alice knows who left⟧w = 1 iff ∃p ∈ pot(Q)[knoww(a, exhQ(p))]
Lahiri (2002) proposes yet another form of reduction, where an LF operation called
interrogative raising resolves the type-mismatch between the proposition-taking denotation
of responsive predicates and the interrogative complement. These different forms of reduction
make distinct predictions with respect to the interpretation of embedded questions, but such
differences within the Q-to-P reduction are irrelevant for the purpose of this survey.
Note that this approach adheres to the two basic hypotheses in (2). Declarative
and interrogative complements have distinct types of objects. In the formulation illus-
trated above, declarative complements denote propositions while interrogative complements
denote sets of propositions. At the same time, responsive predicates are unambiguous
between the declarative-embedding and interrogative-embedding use. They have a proposition-
taking denotation, and the embedding of interrogative complements involves some form of
reduction.
The discussion in the rest of the paper will center around the following two predictions of
the existing Q-to-P reduction accounts as summarized above.6 To aid readability, I intentionally
conflate variables in the object language and metalanguage.
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(11) Predictions of the Q-to-P reduction
a. Q-to-P Reducibility: Let V be a responsive predicate. Then, for every
entity-denoting term x and every interrogative complement Q, whether ⌜x Vs Q⌝ is
true depends only on which declarative complements p are such that ⌜x Vs p⌝.
b. Entailment Prediction: Let V be a responsive predicate. Then, for every
entity-denoting term x and every interrogative complement Q, ⌜x Vs Q⌝ entails that
there is a proposition p ∈ Q such that ⌜x Vs p⌝.
The first prediction states that the truth conditions of an interrogative-embedding sentencewith a
responsive predicate is sufficiently described by declarative-embedding sentences with the same
predicate. For example, the prediction states that whether ⌜Alice knows which students left⌝ is
true depends only onwhat declarative clauses p are such that ⌜Alice knows p⌝ is true. On the other
hand, the second prediction states that an interrogative-embedding sentence entails that some
answer to the embedded question makes the declarative-embedding variant true. For example,
the interpretation of ⌜Alice knows Q⌝ conforms to this prediction as ⌜Alice knows Q⌝ entails that
some proposition p in Q is such that Alice knows p. In the rest of the paper, we evaluate the
viability of Q-to-P reduction as a general theory of responsive predicates by examining these two
predictions.
3 PROBLEMS WITH THE QUESTION-TO-PROPOSITION
REDUCTION
The Q-to-P reduction approach has been the standard approach to question-embedding at least
since Karttunen (1977). Moreover, it fares well with the standard view in epistemic logic after
Hintikka (1962) that know is amodal operator applying to a proposition. However, in recent years,
there have been a number of empirical counterarguments against the approach. In this section,
I review two such arguments: one based on non-reducibility of presuppositional predicates, the
other based on the so-called Predicates of Relevance.7
3.1 Non-reducibility of some presuppositional predicates
The first argument concerns the Q-to-P reducibility prediction in (11a). George (2011) points
out that there are examples involving the responsive predicate know that go against (11a). The
problematic example George describes involves a situation where two individuals have exactly
the same set of propositional knowledge, but have different question-knowledge. The concrete
example goes as follows.
(12) Scenario for know
• Newstopia sells an Italian newspaper, but PaperWorld doesn't.
• Alice and Bill know that one can buy an Italian newspaper at Newstopia.
• Alice neither believes nor disbelieves that one can buy an Italian newspaper at Paper-
World.
• Bill wrongly believes that one can buy an Italian newspaper at PaperWorld.
• Otherwise, Alice and Bill have exactly the same beliefs.
(13) a. Alice knows where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
b. #Bill knows where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
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In the scenario described in (12), sentence (13a) is intuitively true, but (13b) isn't.8
This is problematic for the Q-to-P reduction analysis of know. This is so since Alice and Bill
have exactly the same set of relevant “propositional” knowledge. That is, all sentences with the
declarative-embedding know do not differ in truth values, regardless of whetherAlice or Bill is the
subject. Both sentences in (14) are true while both sentences in (15) are presupposition failures
because of the factivity of know.
(14) a. Alice knows that one can buy an Italian newspaper at Newstopia.
b. Bill knows that one can buy an Italian newspaper at Newstopia.
(15) a. Alice knows that one can buy an Italian newspaper at PaperWorld.
b. Bill knows that one can buy an Italian newspaper at PaperWorld.
Thus, if question-knowledge can be reduced to propositional knowledge, Alice and Bill should
have the same question-knowledge. The fact that (13a) and (13b) differ in the truth values speaks
against this prediction.9
One way to describe the data above is that the question-embedding meaning of know is sensi-
tive to the subject's false belief (Berman, 1991; George, 2011; Preuss, 2001; Spector, 2005; Spector
& Egré, 2015; Theiler et al., 2018). If the subject believes a false proposition in the question mean-
ing, an interrogative-embedding sentence involving factive predicates like know does not sound
true. However, it turns out that the phenomenon is not restricted to the “false-belief” sensitiv-
ity of factive predicates. We can observe a similar phenomenon with the predicate agree in the
construction A agrees with B on… . This is shown in the following example:
(16) Scenario for agree. In addition to the scenario in (12), we assume that Sue believes that
Newstopia sells an Italian newspaper, but PaperWorld doesn't.
(17) a. Alice agrees with Sue on where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
b. #Bill agrees with Sue on where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
The contrast in the judgment in (17) is problematic for the Q-to-P reduction. This is so since
truth values of sentences of the form ⌜Alice∕Bill agrees with Sue that p⌝ doesn't differentiate
Alice and Bill in the scenario. Both sentences in (18) are true while both sentences in (19)
are presupposition failures, given that ⌜x agrees with Sue that p⌝ presupposes that Sue believes
that p.
(18) a. Alice agrees with Sue that one can buy an Italian newspaper at Newstopia.
b. Bill agrees with Sue that one can buy an Italian newspaper at Newstopia.
(19) a. Alice agrees with Sue that one can buy an Italian newspaper at PaperWorld.
b. Bill agrees with Sue that one can buy an Italian newspaper at PaperWorld.
What the above example involving agree shows is that the empirical range of predicates that
exhibit the non-reductive interpretation of question-embedding is broader than just factive predi-
cates and includes non-factive presuppositional predicates like agree (with). The general diagnosis
of the examples would then be the following: sentences involving certain10 presuppositional
responsive predicates with an embedded question are not true if the subject believes a possi-
ble answer to the embedded question that does not satisfy the presupposition. The existence of
such systematic counterexamples is a problem for the Q-to-P reduction approach to responsive
predicates.
There have been attempts to analyze the kind of non-reductive examples discussed in this
section within the Q-to-P reduction approach employing the mechanism of exhaustification
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(Cremers 2016; cf. Uegaki 2015), drawing on the analysis of “intermediate exhaustivity” by
Klinedinst and Rothschild (2011), or decomposition of a lexical meaning into the assertive and
presuppositional component (Spector & Egré, 2015). Due to space limitations, we are unable to
detail such analyses here. Interested readers are referred to the cited works.
3.2 Predicates of relevance
The second problem for the Q-to-P reduction concerns the behavior of predicates of rele-
vance (PoRs; Elliott et al., 2017). PoRs are responsive predicates in that they are compatible with
both declarative and interrogative complements, as shown in (20).
(20) a. Alice cares which students left.
b. Alice cares that Mary left.
What is crucial is the presuppositions of these examples. The declarative embedding use in (20b)
presupposes that Alice believes that Mary left. In contrast, (20a) does not presuppose that there
is a student such that Alice believes that they left. It can be true as long as Alice has interest in
knowing which students left, even if there is no student such that Alice knows that they left.
Note that this is a counterexample to the Entailment Prediction of the Q-to-P reduction in
(11b) above. The observation about (20) suggests that ⌜x cares Q⌝ does not entail that there is a
proposition p ∈ Q such that ⌜x cares that p⌝. This is so since ⌜x cares that p⌝ presupposes that
x believes that p, but ⌜x cares Q⌝ can be true even if there is no proposition p′ ∈ Q such that x
believes p′. Thus, the observed difference between (20a) and (20b) is difficult to capture under
the Q-to-P reduction approach. Under the approach, given the Entailment Prediction, (20a) is
incorrectly predicted to entail that there is a student such that Alice believes that they left.
4 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO RESPONSIVE
PREDICATES
In the last section,we saw two empirical phenomena that are problematic for theQ-to-P reduction
approach to responsive predicates: (i) non-reductive interpretations of certain presuppositional
responsive predicates and (ii) presuppositions of PoRs.
In this section, I will introduce three alternative approaches to the semantics of responsive
predicates, that is, the Proposition-to-Question reduction (P-to-Q reduction) approach,
the uniform approach, and the ambiguity approach. After outlining characteristics of these
approaches togetherwith short reviews of an existing analysis, Iwill compare themby considering
how they would deal with the two phenomena examined in the previous section.
4.1 Proposition-to-Question reduction
As the name suggests, the P-to-Q reduction can be conceived of as the mirror image of the Q-to-P
reduction. Both approaches posit reduction mechanisms to deal with the complementation pat-
tern of responsive predicates, but in different directions. Unlike the Q-to-P reduction, the P-to-Q
reduction assumes that the basic denotation of a responsive predicate is question-taking and posits
an operation that turns a proposition denoted by a declarative complement into a question. This
way, the interrogative-embedding use of responsive predicates is straightforwardly analyzed with
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their denotation while their declarative-embedding use is analyzed as involving the P-to-Q reduc-
tionmechanism.Also, note that the approach adheres to the two basic hypotheses discussed in the
beginning of the paper: semantic distinction of clause types and the non-ambiguity of responsive
predicates.
Uegaki (2015, 2016) proposes an instance of this approach. According to the analysis, respon-
sive predicates like know take a question qua a proposition-set as its first argument:
(21) ⟦know⟧w = 𝜆Q⟨st,t⟩∶ ∃p ∈ Q[p(w)].𝜆x. knoww(x,Answ(Q))
Such a denotation can be directly combined with a question meaning, as follows:
(22) ⟦Alice knows who left⟧w =⟦know⟧w(⟦who left⟦)(a)
=1 iff ∃x[leftw(x)] ∧ knoww(a,Answ(⟦who left⟧)
As the reader can verify, the truth conditions in (22) are exactly the same as what is predicted in
the Q-to-P reduction in (9b) above.
Declarative-embedding sentences involve a reduction from propositions to questions. This
is carried out by the Ident type-shifter proposed in the domain of NP-interpretation by Partee
(1986):
(23) Ident = 𝜆p⟨s,t⟩.{p} (after Partee, 1986)
With this type-shifter, the propositional denotation of a declarative complement can be turned
into a question-type object, which in turn serves as an argument of the predicate know in (21). As
a result, we can derive the intuitive interpretation of know-that sentences. This is illustrated in
the derivation of the truth conditions of the following sentence:
(24) ⟦Alice knows [that Mary left]⟧w =⟦know⟧w(Ident(𝜆w′.leftw′ (m)))(a)
=1 iff leftw(m) ∧ knoww(a,Answ({𝜆w′.leftw′ (m)}))
=1 iff leftw(m) ∧ knoww(a, 𝜆w′.leftw′ (m)))
Here, the presupposition triggered by know in (21) that the question contains a true answer
boils down to factivity, capturing the factive presupposition of know-that. The last step of (24) is
guaranteed by the fact that, if leftw(m) is true,Answ({𝜆w′.leftw′ (m)}) is defined and is equivalent
to the proposition 𝜆w′.leftw′ (m).
4.2 Uniformity
In contrast to the two reduction approaches, which assume the semantic distinction of clause
types, the uniform approach argues that declarative and interrogative complements have the same
semantic type. Under this approach, then, the selectional restriction of responsive predicates
does not pose a problem. Rather, it is something that is expected from the semantic uniformity
of declarative and interrogative complements, without the involvement of any extra reduction
mechanism.
Inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli, Groenendijk, & Roelofsen, 2013) offers a concrete anal-
ysis of responsive predicates in the uniform approach (Ciardelli & Roelofsen, 2015; Theiler,
2014; Theiler, Roelofsen, & Aloni, 2018).11 According to inquisitive semantics, both declarative
and interrogative clauses denote a set of propositions. Here, I will illustrate the treatment in a
version of inquisitive semantics without the property of downward closure (referred to as
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possibility semantics by Ciardelli et al., 2017) in order to make the comparison with other
approaches transparent.12
In this semantics, both declarative and interrogative complements express sets of propositions,
as follows (see Ciardelli et al., 2017 for compositional derivations):
(25) a. ⟦that Mary left⟧ = {𝜆w′.leftw′ (m)}
b. ⟦who left⟧ = {p | ∃x[p = 𝜆w′.leftw′ (x)]}
Given this uniform semantics for complements, the complementation pattern of responsive pred-
icates can be analyzed with the denotation for know we introduced in the discussion of P-to-Q
reduction analysis above. I repeat the denotation for know below:
(26) ⟦know⟧w = 𝜆Q⟨st,t⟩∶ ∃p ∈ Q[p(w)].𝜆x. knoww(x,Answ(Q)) (= (21))
By simply applying this predicate denotation to the complements in (25), the truth conditions of
know-wh and know-that sentences are derived in almost exactly the same way as in the P-to-Q
reduction approach. The difference between the uniform and P-to-Q reduction approach lies in
whether the analysis assumes the set of propositions to be the basic semantic type of a declarative
complement. In the P-to-Q reduction, a declarative complement denotes a proposition simpliciter.
Thus, an extra reduction mechanism is needed to convert the proposition into a set of propo-
sitions. On the other hand, in the uniformity analysis, declarative complements denote a set of
propositions, just like interrogative complements do. Therefore, there is no need for an extra
reduction operation. Because of this difference, the P-to-Q reduction and uniform approach offer
distinct analytical possibilities for treating predicates that only embed declarative complements
(e.g., believe). The interested reader is referred to Uegaki (2016) and Theiler, Roelofsen, and Aloni
(2018).
4.3 Ambiguity
Instead of rejecting the semantic distinction of declarative and interrogative clause types, the
ambiguity approach rejects the assumption that responsive predicates are non-ambiguous. Thus,
the ambiguity approach posits distinct denotations for the proposition-taking and question-taking
denotations of responsive predicates.
A potential problem with the ambiguity approach in general is the intuitive connection
between the declarative-embedding and interrogative-embedding use of responsive predicates.
As pointed out in the beginning of this survey, this intuition is also empirically motivated by data
involving coordinations (see (3)).
George (2011) addresses this problem by proposing the twin relations theory of respon-
sive predicates. According to this theory, every responsive predicate V is associated in the lexicon
with two meaning components V1 and V2. Given these two meaning components, there are
general schemata that specify the question-taking denotation VQ and the proposition-taking
denotation VP. Thus, the analysis captures the intuitive semantic connection between the
question-taking and proposition-taking denotation in terms of their relations to the same seman-
tic core, the two relations V1 and V2.
For example, know is associated with the two meaning components as shown below.
(27) a. know1 ∶= 𝜆p⟨s,t⟩𝜆x𝜆w∶ p(w).knoww(x, p)
b. know2 ∶= 𝜆p⟨s,t⟩𝜆x𝜆w.believew(x, p)→ p(w)
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These meaning components are used to derive the predicate's question-taking and
proposition-taking denotations according to the following general schemata (adapted from
George, 2011, to make the comparison with other approaches transparent).





b. VP ∶= 𝜆p⟨s,t⟩𝜆x𝜆w.V1(p)(x)(w) ∧ V2(p)(x)(w)
Instantiating the schemata with know1 and know2, we get the following denotations of know,
one question-taking and the other proposition-taking.13
(29) a. knowQ = 𝜆Q⟨st,t⟩𝜆x𝜆w∶ ∃p ∈ Q[p(w)].
(
knoww(x,Answ(Q))∧
∀p′ ∈ Q[believew(x, p′)→ p′(w)]
)
b. knowP = 𝜆p⟨s,t⟩𝜆x𝜆w∶ p(w). knoww(x, p)
A substantial feature of the analysis is that the denotation already incorporates a solution to
the problem of non-reducibility of know discussed in Section 3.1. The denotation in (29a) predicts
that ⌜Bill knows Q⌝ would be true only if all propositions in Q that Bill believes are true. This is
obviously not the case in George's scenario in (12). Thus, the analysis correctly captures the fact
that know is sensitive to the subject's false beliefs. In fact, George's (2011) ambiguity theory is
devised as a direct reaction to the non-reducibility of the question-embedding denotation of some
responsive predicates.
5 COMPARING THE NON-TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
How do the three non-traditional approaches fare with the two problems for the Q-to-P reduction
approach? In this section, I go through the two problematic phenomena and examine if the three
approaches have resources to account for them.
5.1 Non-reducibility of presuppositional predicates
5.1.1 P-to-Q reduction and uniformity
Both the P-to-Q reduction and uniform approach can straightforwardly capture the Q-to-P
non-reducibility of presuppositional responsive predicates: The denotation of the predicates can
simply include the condition that the subject cannot believe any proposition that fails the presup-
position of the predicate. For example, know and agree with in such accounts would look like the
following:
(30) a. ⟦know⟧w = 𝜆Q⟨st,t⟩∶ ∃p ∈ Q[p(w)].𝜆x.
(
knoww(x,Answ(Q))∧
∀p′ ∈ Q[believew(x, p′)→ p′(w)]
)
b. ⟦agree with⟧w = 𝜆𝑦𝜆Q⟨st,t⟩∶ ∃p ∈ Q[believew(𝑦, p)].𝜆x.(
believew(x, 𝜆w′. ∀p′ ∈ Q[believew(𝑦, p′)→ p′(w′)])∧
∀p′′ ∈ Q[believew(x, p′′)→ believew(𝑦, p′′)]
)
The second line of the body of the denotation in (30a) states that all propositions in the ques-
tion meaning that the subject believes are true. In (30b), the condition is modified so that all
propositions in the question meaning that the subject believes are also believed by the comitative
(“with”) argument.14 These conditions adequately capture the relevant conditions that are Q-to-P
non-reducible.
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Also, note that there is no distinction between the P-to-Q reduction and uniform approach
with regard to the solution to this problem. This is so since the only difference between the two
approaches concerns the treatment of declarative complements, and what the solution above
hinges on is the question-taking semantics for responsive predicates, which is constant across the
P-to-Q reduction and uniform approach.
5.1.2 Ambiguity
George's (2011) ambiguity approach was proposed as a response to the observation of the Q-to-P
non-reducibility of factive predicates, and we have already seen in Section 4.3 how the analysis
would account for the Q-to-P non-reducibility of know. Here, I will simply show that the anal-
ysis can be extended to agree by defining appropriate meaning components agree-with1 and
agree-with2 as follows:
(31) a. agree-with1 := 𝜆𝑦𝜆p⟨s,t⟩𝜆x𝜆w∶ believew(𝑦, p). believew(𝑦, p) ∧ believew(x, p)
b. agree-with2 := 𝜆y𝜆p⟨s,t⟩𝜆x𝜆w.believew(x, p)→ believew(y, p)
The condition requiring that the subject believes no proposition that fails the presupposition of
(the declarative-embedding version of) the predicate is contributed by agree-with2. In sum, just
like the the P-to-Q reduction and uniform approach, George's (2011) ambiguity approach has
resources to capture the Q-to-P non-reducibility of know and agree.
5.2 Predicates of relevance
Next, we turn to how the three approaches deal with PoRs like care, be relevant, andmatter. The
relevant examples with care are repeated below from Section 3.2.
(20) a. Alice cares which students left.
b. Alice cares that Mary left.
Recall that the problem lies in the presupposition of (20a): it presupposes that Alice believes that
some student left, but not that there is a student such that she believes they left. This cannot be
accurately described in a Q-to-P reduction approach. Given the Entailment Prediction in (11b)
and the fact that (20b) presupposes that Alice believes thatMary left, theQ-to-P reduction predicts
(20a) to entail that there is a student such that Alice believes that they left.
5.2.1 P-to-Q reduction and uniformity
The P-to-Q reduction and uniform approach can accurately account for the presupposition of
(20a) by making the denotation of care refer to its question argument itself. For example, the
denotation of care can be analyzed as follows:
(32) ⟦care⟧w = 𝜆Q⟨st,t⟩∶ ∃p ∈ Q[p(w′)].𝜆x∶ believew(x, 𝜆w′.∃p′ ∈ Q[p′(w′)]).carew(x,Q)
The presupposition with the second underline states that x believes that some answer of the
embedded question is true. This captures the presuppositions of (20a): it only presupposes that
Alice believes that some student left, not that there is a student such that Alice believes that
they left.
The denotation for care in (32) correctly captures the presuppositions of the
declarative-embedding sentence in (20b) as well, given that the P-to-Q reduction and uniform
approach assign a singleton-set meaning to declarative complements, either through a reduction
operation or as the basic meaning of the complement itself.
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(33) ⟦(20b)⟧w = 1 iff leftw(m) ∧ believew(a, 𝜆w′.leftw′ (m)) ∧ carew(a, {𝜆w′.leftw′ (m)})
Since a belief that some proposition in a singleton set question is true is equivalent to the belief
that the unique proposition in the singleton set is true, the second presupposition of care in (32)
boils down to the presupposition that the subject believes the complement.
5.2.2 Ambiguity
How would the ambiguity approach deal with PoRs? Interestingly, there is no obvious way in
which the approach can capture the problematic presuppositions of PoRs.
To see how George (2011) would deal with PoRs, let us start with the predicted denotations of
the question-taking careQ and the proposition-taking careP according to the proposed schema:





b. careP = 𝜆p⟨s,t⟩𝜆x𝜆w.care1(p)(x)(w) ∧ care2(p)(x)(w)
The content of these meanings are still unclear unless care1 and care2 are substantiated.
However, we already know that the belief presupposition of care-that—that the subject believes
the complement—has to be encoded in care1 or care2 in (34b). But then, in either case,
careQ(Q)(x)(w) is predicted to entail that, for some proposition p ∈ Q, x believes p. Here is why: if
care1 triggers the belief presupposition, given the first line of (34a), careQ(Q)(x)(w)would be true
only if there is some proposition inQ that is believed by x inw; On the other hand, if care2 triggers
the belief presupposition, given the second line of (34a), careQ(Q)(x)(w) would be true only if all
propositions in Q are believed by x in w. Thus, whether the belief presupposition is encoded in
care1 or in care2, careQ(Q)(x)(w) would entail that there is a proposition in Q that is believed by
x in w. What we see here is that the predicted belief presupposition of the question-embedding
care in George's (2011) theory is too strong, just as in the case of Q-to-P reduction approach.
6 CONSTRAINTS ON THE DENOTATIONS OF RESPONSIVE
PREDICATES
In addition to the empirical considerations made in the previous sections, we can compare the
approaches based on the restrictiveness of theories, that is, whether each approach places a rea-
sonable constraint on the space of possible denotations of responsive predicates. Spector and Egré
(2015) discuss this point, using the fictitious responsive predicate *shknow, whichmeans “know”
with declarative complements and “wonder” with interrogative complements. They argue that
a semantic theory of responsive predicates should be able to explain why it is hard to imagine a
language having *shknow in its lexicon.
Under the Q-to-P reduction, shknow is impossible because ⌜x shknows Q⌝ would be ana-
lyzed as ⟦shknow⟧w(Answ(Q))(x) in the Q-to-P reduction, which in turn would mean “x knows
Answ(Q)” instead of “x wonders Q”. George's (2011) twin relations theory also makes it impossi-
ble to define shknow. On the other hand, it is possible to define shknow under the P-to-Q reduction
or the uniform approach, as follows:
(35) ⟦*shknow⟧w = 𝜆Q⟨st,t⟩𝜆x.
( |Q| = 1→ ∃p ∈ Q[knoww(x, p)]∧|Q| ≠ 1→ wonderw(x,Q)
)
UEGAKI 13 of 17
What this means is that the Q-to-P reduction/uniform approaches by themselves are not restricted
enough to rule out the unrealistic predicate shknow (George, 2011, Section§4.5.2).
This said, it is possible to posit additional constraints on responsive predicate denotations in
the Q-to-P reduction/uniform approaches. As a concrete example, I will propose an original con-
straint that hasn't been discussed in the previous literature. This constraint requires responsive
predicate denotations to obey a weaker version of the Entailment Prediction, which I will call the
strawson-entailment property, as defined below:15
(36) A responsive predicate V has the strawson-entailment property iff for every
entity-denoting term x and every interrogative complementQ, ⌜x Vs Q⌝ entails that there
is a proposition p ∈ Q such that, if the presupposition of ⌜x Vs p⌝ is satisfied,
⌜x Vs p⌝ is true.
(37) A constraint on responsive predicate denotations:
All responsive predicates have the Strawson-entailment property.
This constraint essentially states that a responsive predicate has to obey the Entailment Pre-
diction in the assertive component of its meaning. The predicate *shknow in (35) violates this
constraint since ⌜x shknows Q⌝ (which means “xwonders Q”) does not entail that there is p ∈ Q
such that, if ⌜x shknows p⌝ (which means “x knows p”) is defined, it is true. On the other hand,
care under the analysis in (32) can be made to obey this constraint by requiring that for every
x, Q, w, carew(x,Q) → ∃p ∈ Q[carew(x, {p})],
16 without making it conform to the Entailment
Prediction.
Theiler et al. (2018, Section 6) propose further constraints on the denotations of responsive
predicates within the uniform approach. To the extent that it is possible to posit feasible con-
straints on the denotation of responsive predicates in the P-to-Q reduction/uniform approaches,
the unrestricted nature of the approaches themselves does not provide a strong argument
against them.
It is worth noting that the issue here is reminiscent of the constraints on generalized quantifier
denotations (Barwise & Cooper, 1981; Keenan & Stavi, 1986). Natural languages lexicalize only a
small subset of meanings that can in principle be expressed as a generalized quantifier. The gen-
eralized quantifier theory has sought to formulate empirically feasible constraints on quantifier
denotations (e.g., conservativity). At the same time, researchers have investigated the question of
why such constraints exist from computational and learnability standpoints (e.g., Hunter & Lidz,
2013; Steinert-Threlkeld & Szymanik, to appear). Following the lead of research in this domain,
an imminent task for the theory of responsive predicates is to discover feasible constraints on
the denotation of responsive predicates and seek explanations for the existence of such con-
straints.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this survey, we reviewed the traditional Q-to-P reduction approach to the semantics of respon-
sive predicates, as well as three non-traditional approaches. The latter three approaches, that is,
the P-to-Q reduction approach, the uniform approach, and the ambiguity approach, were com-
pared in viewof how theywould treat two phenomena that pose problems for theQ-to-P reduction
approach. The non-reducibility of presuppositional predicates can be accounted for in all three
approaches by encoding the appropriate conditions in the lexical denotations (or meaning cores)
of relevant predicates. On the other hand, when it comes to the other problemwith the traditional
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approach, that is, Predicates of Relevance, only the P-to-Q reduction and uniform approach, but
not the ambiguity approach, have necessary resources to account for their behavior. In Table 1,
the comparison is summarized in terms of whether a theory shares the two problematic pre-
dictions, that is, Q-to-P reducibility and the Entailment Prediction, with the Q-to-P reduction
approach.
Although the current survey is mostly concerned with the behavior of English responsive
predicates, it is evident that in-depth cross-linguistic investigation of the lexical semantics of
responsive predicates sheds additional light on the debate. For example, Roberts (2017) claims
that the Estonian verb mõtlema—whose meaning is close to “wonder” with an interrogative
complement while it is close to “think” with a declarative complement—can be adequately ana-
lyzed only under the P-to-Q reduction/uniform approaches to responsive predicates. At the same
time, as discussed in Section 6, whichever approaches that turn out to be cross-linguistically
empirically adequate should be evaluated in view of their predictive powers, in particular, how
they can explain cross-linguistically stable generalizations about the interpretations of responsive
predicates.
Finally, theories of responsive predicates can also be assessed in view of their predictions con-
cerning the selectional restrictions of other clause-embedding predicates, such as those that only
embed interrogative complements (e.g., wonder and inquire) and those that only embed declar-
ative complements (e.g., believe and hope). The selectional restrictions of these predicates is an
active domain of research in the current literature. In particular, Uegaki (2015, 2016) and Cia-
rdelli and Roelofsen (2015) explain why wonder cannot embed declarative complements, based
on the following line of analysis of ⌜x wonders Q⌝:
(38) [[wonder]]w(Q)(x) = 1 only if
(i) there is some p ∈ Q such that x neither believes p nor believes ¬p
(ii) x believes that there is some p′ ∈ Q that is true.
This semantics predicts that ⌜x wonders that p⌝ results in a systematic contradiction under the
P-to-Q reduction/uniform approach since the two conditions in (38) contradict each other if Q =
{p}.
Theiler et al. (2018) furthermore deal with the selectional restrictions of verbs of dependency
(e.g., depend on). Theiler et al. (2017) and Mayr (2017) explain the selectional restrictions
of neg-raising attitude predicates (e.g., believe) and truth-evaluating predicates (e.g., be true),
drawing on an earlier observation by Zuber (1982). Among non-neg-raising predicates, Uegaki
and Sudo (2017, 2018) propose an explanation for the selectional restrictions of non-veridical
preferential predicates (e.g., hope and fear) under the uniform approach.
TABLE 1 Comparison of the four approaches
Q-to-P reducibility Entailment Prediction
Q-to-P reduction Yes/Noa Yes
P-to-Q reduction No No
Uniformity No No
Ambiguity (esp. George, 2011) No Yes
aNo, if the non-presuppositional counterpart of a presuppositional predicate can be retrieved
through, for example, decomposition (Spector & Egré, 2015; see the last paragraph of Section 3.1)
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ENDNOTES
1 Technically, Karttunen (1977) and Spector and Egré (2015) define two lexical entries for a responsive predicate, one with a
proposition-taking denotation and the other with a question-taking denotation. Thus, prima facie, they might seem to fall
under the ambiguity approach. However, I categorize them as the Q-to-P reduction approach since their theories include
a general mechanism that derives an interrogative-embedding denotation from a declarative-embedding denotation. That
is, they analyze the interpretation of interrogative-embedding case in terms of proposition-taking denotation of responsive
predicates. Similarly, I categorize Ginzburg's (1995) theory as an instance of the Q-to-P reduction as the mechanism of
question-to-fact/proposition coercion in his theory effectively plays the role of the Q-to-P reduction.
2 For reasons of space, I will not discuss the issue concerning the “de re”/“de dicto” ambiguity of the wh-term. The interested
reader is referred to the survey by Hagstrom (2003) and references cited therein.
3 Following Heim and Kratzer (1998), I model presuppositions using domain restrictions on functions, written after the colon
(“:”) in a lambda term with an underline. Truth conditions projected from presuppositions are also underlined.
4 Incidentally, this analysis is close to one of the first formal semantic analysis of “knowing-who” by Hintikka (1962, p. 131) ,
who analyzes the meaning of “S knows who is P” as ∃x[KS(P(x))].
5 Spector and Egré (2015) analyze weakly-exhaustive readings also in terms of an existential quantification over Pot(Q) but
using a different operator from exh in the assertive component, while keeping the strongly-exhaustive semantics in the
presupposition.
6 It is worth noting that the two predictions are not necessarily entailed by the Q-to-P reduction as defined in (5). For example,
if a reduction mechanism involves a negation in Answ, (11b) is not predicted. However, such a reduction mechanism would
have an empirical difficulty capturing the basic truth conditions of know-wh. Also, see the last paragraph of Section 3.1 for
Q-to-P reduction analyses that avoid the prediction in (11a) based on additional assumptions.
7 See Uegaki (2016) for another argument against the Q-to-P reduction based on nominal complements of attitude predicates.
8 Some native speakers express that the judgment depends on the proportion of the false propositions believed by Bill with
respect to the set of all propositions in the question meaning. For example, even if (13b) sounds false in the given situation to
these speakers, they feel that the falsity is not clear in a situationwhere Bill knows a hundred stores that sell Italian newspapers
and incorrectly believes for just one store that it does. Note, however, that this judgment is not a problem for the argument
here as long as there is a situation in which these speakers too find a contrast in (13).
9 George's (2011) example above is based on examples that intuitively have amention-some interpretation of the complement.
Spector (2005), on the other hand, reports a non-reductive judgment of question-embedding know embedding a complement
with a weakly-exhaustive interpretation (see also Berman, 1991, Section 4.3.2, and Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984, p. 180, for
similar observations). See (7) for the distinction between the two interpretations.
10 I do not generalize this diagnosis to all presuppositional responsive predicates since it is not clear if emotive factives such as
surprise and annoy exhibit non-reducibility.
11 Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) can be considered as a predecessor of the uniform approach since, for them, both declarative
and interrogative complements express propositional concepts, which are selected by responsive predicates such as guess.
Their treatment of veridical predicates such as know, however, involves Q-to-P reduction in the form of “extensionalization”
and thus is unable to deal with the problem of non-reducibility.
12 See Ciardelli et al. (2017) for a comparison of the semantics with and without the downward closure and theoretical and
empirical motivations for preferring the former.
13 I assume that the factive presupposition of know1 is existentially projected in knowQ.
14 In footnote 8, I discussed native speaker judgments that are sensitive to the proportion of false propositions (or propositions
that are not believed by the “with”-argument) in the set of relevant propositions believed by the subject. The condition in
the second line of the denotations in (30) can be minimally modified to capture such sensitivity to the proportion of false
propositions.
15 The choice of the term is based on von Fintel's (1999) notion of strawson entailment.
16 Proof: Given the analysis in (32), for every x, Q, w, [[cares]]w(Q)(x) is true only if carew(x,Q). Given the above requirement on
care, this in turn is true only if there is a proposition p ∈ Q such that carew(x, {p}). Given (32), such a proposition p is such
that, if [[care]]w({p})(x) is defined, [[care]]w({p})(x) is true. This means that if ⌜x cares that p⌝ is defined, it is true.
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